Even as Haiti reconstruction efforts proceed apace, the public relations battle is heating up. Juan Forero, a conservative reporter with the Washington Post, remarks that Obama might benefit politically from relief operations. "A successful mission," he points out, "...could advance U.S. diplomacy in a region long suspicious of U.S. intentions." Forero quotes Cresencio Arcos, a former U.S. ambassador to Honduras who sees good things in store. "I think that the United States will look very magnanimous," the diplomat remarked. "Haiti is good for the United States," he added, "to show its humanitarian side."
The U.S. is in dire need of an image makeover, and some cynical Washington policymakers may privately share Arcos' sentiments. Shortly after taking office Obama promised a new beginning with Latin America, emphasizing that there would be "no senior or junior partner" in terms of the U.S. relationship with the wider region. The U.S. president even shook hands with Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and called Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva "my man."
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February 20, 2010
The Honduran Dam Controversy and Micheletti’s Legacy
Roberto Micheletti's de facto government is back in the news. Last week, news broke in Honduras that the official newspaper, La Gaceta, published two different versions with the same number and date in the last days of Micheletti's time in the Presidential Palace. The major difference? One version contained a controversial dam contract. After many months of Micheletti promoting his de facto government as the clean and honest side of the Liberal Party, the gacetazo (as the Honduran media has deemed the scandal) will further mar the legacy of Micheletti and his supporters.
In their last days in office, presidents often sign controversial decrees that would have proved too controversial earlier in their term. In the United States, for instance, recent presidents have extended pardons to convicts and established vast natural reserves. Presidents must be careful, however, not to over-step in their last days, or else their legacy will be stained by controversy. President Clinton, for instance, went too far when he pardoned Mark Rich, sparking allegations that the wealthy Rich had purchased his freedom with political contributions.
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In their last days in office, presidents often sign controversial decrees that would have proved too controversial earlier in their term. In the United States, for instance, recent presidents have extended pardons to convicts and established vast natural reserves. Presidents must be careful, however, not to over-step in their last days, or else their legacy will be stained by controversy. President Clinton, for instance, went too far when he pardoned Mark Rich, sparking allegations that the wealthy Rich had purchased his freedom with political contributions.
More...
February 1, 2010
Impunity on the Prowl, in Honduras and Here
It was a telephone call so urgent that it echoes across borders. In early December, Honduran human rights activist Walter Trochéz was kidnapped while walking near his home in the capital, Tegucigalpa. Since the June 2009 coup in his country, Trochéz had documented a pattern of disappearances and killings of 15 lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community leaders. His call to U.S. colleagues was to alert them he had nearly joined the list.
Trochéz escaped the four masked men who abducted him Dec. 4. But just nine days later he was dead. The chain of murders of LGBT activists in Honduras, for which no suspects are in custody, has rattled an already besieged community and raised alarms about police and private vigilantes exploiting the lack of oversight to operate with impunity. For human rights activists in the U.S., outrage at the atrocities should be tinged with concern for a far subtler form of impunity taking root in our own legal system.
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Trochéz escaped the four masked men who abducted him Dec. 4. But just nine days later he was dead. The chain of murders of LGBT activists in Honduras, for which no suspects are in custody, has rattled an already besieged community and raised alarms about police and private vigilantes exploiting the lack of oversight to operate with impunity. For human rights activists in the U.S., outrage at the atrocities should be tinged with concern for a far subtler form of impunity taking root in our own legal system.
More...
Why Washington Cares About Countries Like Haiti and Honduras
When I write about U.S. foreign policy in places like Haiti or Honduras, I often get responses from people who find it difficult to believe that the U.S. government would care enough about these countries to try and control or topple their governments. These are small, poor countries with little in the way of resources or markets. Why should Washington policy-makers care who runs them?
Unfortunately they do care. A lot. They care enough about Haiti to have overthrown the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide not once, but twice. The first time, in 1991, it was done covertly. We only found out after the fact that the people who led the coup were paid by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. And then Emmanuel Constant, the leader of the most notorious death squad there - which killed thousands of Aristide's supporters after the coup - told CBS News that he too, was funded by the CIA.
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Unfortunately they do care. A lot. They care enough about Haiti to have overthrown the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide not once, but twice. The first time, in 1991, it was done covertly. We only found out after the fact that the people who led the coup were paid by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. And then Emmanuel Constant, the leader of the most notorious death squad there - which killed thousands of Aristide's supporters after the coup - told CBS News that he too, was funded by the CIA.
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January 28, 2010
January 26, 2010
Restoring International Relations With Honduras: A Way Forward
Honduras today is a country divided - both internally and from the international community. Last year's June 28 coup d'état that ousted President Manuel Zelaya did more than disrupt democratic order; it fractured families, communities and political parties. The coup regime has not been recognized by the Obama Administration because of the upending of the constitutional order. Over these last months the de facto government has spurned all international efforts to negotiate a way forward with the legitimately elected president. In the wake of this disruption and the suspension of legal safeguards, the Honduran people have been subjected to serious and systematic violations of human rights and the curtailment of freedom of expression. Despite this infelicitous circumstance, elections were nevertheless held in November. On January 27, the winner of this election, Porfirio (Pepe) Lobo Sosa, will be inaugurated as the new President of Honduras.
As president of this politically alienated and distrustful country, it is imperative that President Lobo take immediate steps to begin to restore confidence in the government by reaching out to disaffected social groups, promoting reconciliation and seeking to rebuild trust in democratic institutions. In addition it will be imperative for the incoming administration to reassure the international community of his intention to promote the rule of law by restoring civil liberties and investigating past abuses. The international community, for its part, will look for tangible signs that President Lobo is taking steps towards reconciliation and addressing the country's vexing economic and governance challenges. Before resumption of full diplomatic relations and the resumption of U.S. economic aid, the Obama Administration, with the support of the Congress, should consider imposing the following conditions:
More...
As president of this politically alienated and distrustful country, it is imperative that President Lobo take immediate steps to begin to restore confidence in the government by reaching out to disaffected social groups, promoting reconciliation and seeking to rebuild trust in democratic institutions. In addition it will be imperative for the incoming administration to reassure the international community of his intention to promote the rule of law by restoring civil liberties and investigating past abuses. The international community, for its part, will look for tangible signs that President Lobo is taking steps towards reconciliation and addressing the country's vexing economic and governance challenges. Before resumption of full diplomatic relations and the resumption of U.S. economic aid, the Obama Administration, with the support of the Congress, should consider imposing the following conditions:
More...
January 20, 2010
Haiti’s Tragedy and the Inevitable Controversy
The Haiti earthquake has produced an overwhelming humanitarian response from governments and people everywhere. This disaster has occurred in one of the world's poorest countries, a nation whose infrastructure and governmental institutions were fragile to begin with. The relief challenge is extraordinary, requiring the removal of bodies, the treatment of the wounded, and the feeding and care of millions of people.
Complicating the effort is a chorus of critics who believe the response would be faster and more efficient under different leadership. They argue that the military or FEMA should be in the lead for the US Government rather than USAID. I have heard these appeals before when serving as the government's coordinator for relief efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Honduras, Nicaragua and Haiti.
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Complicating the effort is a chorus of critics who believe the response would be faster and more efficient under different leadership. They argue that the military or FEMA should be in the lead for the US Government rather than USAID. I have heard these appeals before when serving as the government's coordinator for relief efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Honduras, Nicaragua and Haiti.
More...
December 30, 2009
December 1, 2009
21st Century Socialism’s Impact on Latin American Economic Performance
Hugo Chavez came to power in 1998 promising a change in the way government was run, with the plight of the poor and a war against corruption as the centerpiece of his campaign platform. More than 10 years and $200 billion in oil revenue later, there is little perceptible change in the effectiveness of social spending in Venezuela, and corruption is arguably as bad, or worse, than it was prior to his election. Yet Chavez remains in power, with ambition to stay there indefinitely, and his brand of 21st century socialism has been exported throughout Latin America. This article examines whether positive economic change has occurred in the Latin American countries that have embraced Chavez's political model.
Real GDP growth has traditionally gyrated - sometimes wildly - in Latin America. Since Chavez was first elected, real GDP has mostly declined in Venezuela, apart from a short period in 2004. Since Morales was elected in 2005 in Bolivia, real GDP has remained steady. Since Correa took office in 2007, Ecuador's real GDP briefly rose, before getting caught up in the global recession. Nicaragua's real GDP has mostly consistently under-performed against the region and the world average, was below zero from 1984-1994, and has been in steady decline since 2004.
Non-socialist countries in Latin America have generally performed better. Although Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia's real GDP growth all gyrated - sometimes wildly - between 1980 and 2008, in general, their rates of growth were higher than the 21st century socialist countries. Like Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia are all resource rich. The primary difference is how they transitioned from military to democratic governments, and how each government managed or mismanaged its fiscal resources.
The level of direct investment in the economy in Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela from 1980 to 2008 is mixed. The worst performer, by far, is Venezuela, which declined from nearly $6 billion in 1998 to less than $1 billion by 2008. Part of this is due to the anti-foreign investment laws that were passed since Chavez came to power, nationalizations in key sectors, and a reliance on more indigenous forms of investment. In Bolivia, the initial decline in FDI leveled off since Morales modified his nationalization program in the power sector, but investment levels remain depressed compared with levels in the late 1990s. Although investment levels have slowly risen in Honduras since 2002, this trend is likely to be reversed based on the political change that occurred in the country earlier this year. Investment levels in Ecuador have been declining since 2004, and like Nicaragua and Bolivia, have always been under $1 billion per annum.
By contrast, average direct investment levels have risen considerably since the mid-1990s in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. Brazil's investment levels has been at least 10 percent since 1996, and even at their low points since that time, the other countries' investment levels has not dropped below $1 billion.
Inflation rates gyrated wildly in Venezuela and Ecuador in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching as high as 100% in Venezuela in 1996 and Ecuador in 2000. It is on the rise again in Venezuela, and is projected by the IMF to approach 50% next year. After reaching incredible highs of more than 11,000 percent in Bolivia and more than 12,000 percent in Nicaragua in the 1980s, inflation has been at more manageable levels since the 1990s, and remains under control in Honduras.
Although Argentina and Brazil experienced periods of hyper-inflation, inflation has been under control in Argentina since 1992 and in Brazil since 1996, and in Chile and Colombia throughout the reporting period.
Unemployment remains a persistent problem in most of Latin America, with a contributing factor being high birth rates. As is the case with so many other statistics for the referenced countries, the unemployment rates have tended to lack consistency. Since Chavez came to power, the unemployment rate has been cut in half, from 15% to 7.5%, due, largely, to the swelling ranks of public employees. Ecuador's unemployment rate has been roughly halved, as well, from a high of 14% in 1999 to roughly 7% in 2008. IMF statistics for Bolivia and Nicaragua are incomplete, but the trend lines were rising in both countries in the middle of this decade.
Unemployment remains an issue in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The unemployment rate in Argentina reached as high as 18% in the early part of this decade, and was reduced to 7.5% in 2008. The worst affected of the four non-socialist countries has been Colombia, whose unemployment rate reached 20% in 2000, but had been reduced to 11% by 2008. Brazil's rate was as high as 10% and Chile's 8% earlier this decade, but were both 7.5% in 2008. Of all of the statistics measured in this study, unemployed poses the most persistent challenge.
In terms of exports, it is no surprise that Venezuela's statistics are quite favorable, given Chavez's emphasis on revitalization of the oil sector. Export income has more than tripled since Chavez came to power. A similar story in Ecuador, where the maturation of the oil sector has resulted in a doubling of export income since 2001. Bolivia's statistics might have been even more favorable if it were not for the nationalizations since 2005. Both Bolivia's and Nicaragua's export statistics are unimpressive, being nearly flat from 1980 to 2003.
The non-socialist countries being used in this study were certainly not flat since 1986. In the case of Brazil, export income has risen ten-fold, to approximately $200 billion since that time. Argentina's, Chile's, and Colombia's export income all rose dramatically during the period. This coincided with a generally more liberalized trade regime, along with enlightened policy decisions on the part of the region's governments.
Venezuela's jump in exports has been matched by a concurrent rise in imports due to a corresponding rise in foreign exchange levels and domestic demand. The same is true in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. That is sustainable as long as export income and consumption levels rise. What countries like Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela must address is how rising import levels can be sustained when oil export revenue falls, as has been the case in the past year. In Venezuela's case, expectation levels among the general populace have risen in accordance with oil revenue generation. Chavez has his hands full in managing those expectations since the price of oil was halved a year ago.
Although the cost of a barrel of oil rose nearly 15-fold between 1998 and 2008, Latin America's socialist petro states generally tended not to benefit from a meaningful rise in foreign exchange reserves until well into the current decade. The additional revenue generated for national budgets in the interim years appears to have evaporated, as the region's petro states squandered much of the wealth that was created. Venezuela's propensity for wild reserve fluctuations persisted for the entire 20-year period being observed - throughout Hugo Chavez's reign as President. For those Latin American countries that do not have petro-based economies, such as Nicaragua, the chronic foreign exchange deficit has continued unabated.
Brazil enjoyed a tremendous rise in its reserve asset position since 2005, largely the result of the spike in oil prices between 2005 and 2008. Its skillful management of its fiscal resources is in stark contrast to Venezuela. The significant new oil discoveries that have been made in the past two years imply that eventually, it will become the dominant hydrocarbon supplier in the region, and may become the new model for social development in the region.
In spite of the avalanche of oil wealth over the past 10 years, the region's petro states have generally failed to invest adequately in local infrastructure or keep pace with the rising levels of expectation among their populations. Chronic mismanagement of indigenous infrastructure, poor planning, and endemic corruption have also contributed to the problem, as has frozen tariff levels for water and power, providing a disincentive to conserve resources, and exacerbating the problem. This has exacerbated the level of frustration among voters and raised question about whether 21st Century Socialism is ultimately any different than any other political movement in terms of rhetoric and deliverables.
In Venezuela, less than a quarter of the $643 million budgeted for electricity infrastructure projects between 2001 and 2005 was actually spent, and less than 10 percent of the additional electricity generating capacity deemed necessary for the country's growing population 10 years ago has been realized. Chavez responded in October 2009 by implementing power and water rationing, and blaming El Nino for the problem. The bottom line is that in spite of all his rhetoric and promises, Chavez has failed to deliver what he promised to his people.
Even when times have been good, Latin America's socialist countries have still failed to deliver meaningful political and economic reforms or effective public spending programs. From an economic perspective, 21st Century Socialism has failed to deliver a meaningfully improved standard of living for most of the people who have embraced Chavez's credo. The global recession has only served to highlight many of the inherent contradictions in Chavez's 'revolution'.
Real GDP growth has traditionally gyrated - sometimes wildly - in Latin America. Since Chavez was first elected, real GDP has mostly declined in Venezuela, apart from a short period in 2004. Since Morales was elected in 2005 in Bolivia, real GDP has remained steady. Since Correa took office in 2007, Ecuador's real GDP briefly rose, before getting caught up in the global recession. Nicaragua's real GDP has mostly consistently under-performed against the region and the world average, was below zero from 1984-1994, and has been in steady decline since 2004.
Non-socialist countries in Latin America have generally performed better. Although Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia's real GDP growth all gyrated - sometimes wildly - between 1980 and 2008, in general, their rates of growth were higher than the 21st century socialist countries. Like Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia are all resource rich. The primary difference is how they transitioned from military to democratic governments, and how each government managed or mismanaged its fiscal resources.
The level of direct investment in the economy in Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela from 1980 to 2008 is mixed. The worst performer, by far, is Venezuela, which declined from nearly $6 billion in 1998 to less than $1 billion by 2008. Part of this is due to the anti-foreign investment laws that were passed since Chavez came to power, nationalizations in key sectors, and a reliance on more indigenous forms of investment. In Bolivia, the initial decline in FDI leveled off since Morales modified his nationalization program in the power sector, but investment levels remain depressed compared with levels in the late 1990s. Although investment levels have slowly risen in Honduras since 2002, this trend is likely to be reversed based on the political change that occurred in the country earlier this year. Investment levels in Ecuador have been declining since 2004, and like Nicaragua and Bolivia, have always been under $1 billion per annum.
By contrast, average direct investment levels have risen considerably since the mid-1990s in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. Brazil's investment levels has been at least 10 percent since 1996, and even at their low points since that time, the other countries' investment levels has not dropped below $1 billion.
Inflation rates gyrated wildly in Venezuela and Ecuador in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching as high as 100% in Venezuela in 1996 and Ecuador in 2000. It is on the rise again in Venezuela, and is projected by the IMF to approach 50% next year. After reaching incredible highs of more than 11,000 percent in Bolivia and more than 12,000 percent in Nicaragua in the 1980s, inflation has been at more manageable levels since the 1990s, and remains under control in Honduras.
Although Argentina and Brazil experienced periods of hyper-inflation, inflation has been under control in Argentina since 1992 and in Brazil since 1996, and in Chile and Colombia throughout the reporting period.
Unemployment remains a persistent problem in most of Latin America, with a contributing factor being high birth rates. As is the case with so many other statistics for the referenced countries, the unemployment rates have tended to lack consistency. Since Chavez came to power, the unemployment rate has been cut in half, from 15% to 7.5%, due, largely, to the swelling ranks of public employees. Ecuador's unemployment rate has been roughly halved, as well, from a high of 14% in 1999 to roughly 7% in 2008. IMF statistics for Bolivia and Nicaragua are incomplete, but the trend lines were rising in both countries in the middle of this decade.
Unemployment remains an issue in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The unemployment rate in Argentina reached as high as 18% in the early part of this decade, and was reduced to 7.5% in 2008. The worst affected of the four non-socialist countries has been Colombia, whose unemployment rate reached 20% in 2000, but had been reduced to 11% by 2008. Brazil's rate was as high as 10% and Chile's 8% earlier this decade, but were both 7.5% in 2008. Of all of the statistics measured in this study, unemployed poses the most persistent challenge.
In terms of exports, it is no surprise that Venezuela's statistics are quite favorable, given Chavez's emphasis on revitalization of the oil sector. Export income has more than tripled since Chavez came to power. A similar story in Ecuador, where the maturation of the oil sector has resulted in a doubling of export income since 2001. Bolivia's statistics might have been even more favorable if it were not for the nationalizations since 2005. Both Bolivia's and Nicaragua's export statistics are unimpressive, being nearly flat from 1980 to 2003.
The non-socialist countries being used in this study were certainly not flat since 1986. In the case of Brazil, export income has risen ten-fold, to approximately $200 billion since that time. Argentina's, Chile's, and Colombia's export income all rose dramatically during the period. This coincided with a generally more liberalized trade regime, along with enlightened policy decisions on the part of the region's governments.
Venezuela's jump in exports has been matched by a concurrent rise in imports due to a corresponding rise in foreign exchange levels and domestic demand. The same is true in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. That is sustainable as long as export income and consumption levels rise. What countries like Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela must address is how rising import levels can be sustained when oil export revenue falls, as has been the case in the past year. In Venezuela's case, expectation levels among the general populace have risen in accordance with oil revenue generation. Chavez has his hands full in managing those expectations since the price of oil was halved a year ago.
Although the cost of a barrel of oil rose nearly 15-fold between 1998 and 2008, Latin America's socialist petro states generally tended not to benefit from a meaningful rise in foreign exchange reserves until well into the current decade. The additional revenue generated for national budgets in the interim years appears to have evaporated, as the region's petro states squandered much of the wealth that was created. Venezuela's propensity for wild reserve fluctuations persisted for the entire 20-year period being observed - throughout Hugo Chavez's reign as President. For those Latin American countries that do not have petro-based economies, such as Nicaragua, the chronic foreign exchange deficit has continued unabated.
Brazil enjoyed a tremendous rise in its reserve asset position since 2005, largely the result of the spike in oil prices between 2005 and 2008. Its skillful management of its fiscal resources is in stark contrast to Venezuela. The significant new oil discoveries that have been made in the past two years imply that eventually, it will become the dominant hydrocarbon supplier in the region, and may become the new model for social development in the region.
In spite of the avalanche of oil wealth over the past 10 years, the region's petro states have generally failed to invest adequately in local infrastructure or keep pace with the rising levels of expectation among their populations. Chronic mismanagement of indigenous infrastructure, poor planning, and endemic corruption have also contributed to the problem, as has frozen tariff levels for water and power, providing a disincentive to conserve resources, and exacerbating the problem. This has exacerbated the level of frustration among voters and raised question about whether 21st Century Socialism is ultimately any different than any other political movement in terms of rhetoric and deliverables.
In Venezuela, less than a quarter of the $643 million budgeted for electricity infrastructure projects between 2001 and 2005 was actually spent, and less than 10 percent of the additional electricity generating capacity deemed necessary for the country's growing population 10 years ago has been realized. Chavez responded in October 2009 by implementing power and water rationing, and blaming El Nino for the problem. The bottom line is that in spite of all his rhetoric and promises, Chavez has failed to deliver what he promised to his people.
Even when times have been good, Latin America's socialist countries have still failed to deliver meaningful political and economic reforms or effective public spending programs. From an economic perspective, 21st Century Socialism has failed to deliver a meaningfully improved standard of living for most of the people who have embraced Chavez's credo. The global recession has only served to highlight many of the inherent contradictions in Chavez's 'revolution'.
November 27, 2009
Sunday’s Elections Left As Risky Option in Honduras
As Hondurans go to the polls this Sunday, months of negotiations and years of diplomatic precedent hang in the balance. The Obama administration hopes that the presidential elections will end the political crisis in Honduras. The deep divisions in Honduran society and the firmness with which most Latin American leaders have rejected the de facto government and the elections, however, risk dashing the administration's hopes.
On June 28th, the Honduran Congress and Supreme Court voted to remove President Manuel Zelaya. This followed Zelaya's disregard of their rejection of a planned ballot to allow for a constituent assembly. Acting under Supreme Court order, in the early morning, soldiers rousted the President and placed him--still in his pajamas--on a plane to Costa Rica. Because the removal strayed from the Honduran constitution, the international community immediately condemned the act as a coup and called for Zelaya's restoration. But the de facto government, led by Roberto Micheletti, asserted that the removal was constitutional, while admitting that Zelaya's exile--not to mention lack of due process--was a "mistake."
The international community's position was virtually unanimous, demanding Zelaya's restoration before previously scheduled November elections. Subsequently, Micheletti dragged his feet, thwarting regional negotiators' efforts to resolve the impasse and ignoring economic and diplomatic sanctions by the U.S. and others.
Last month, under pressure to find some exit, U.S. negotiators traveled to Tegucigalpa, engineered an agreement, and declared victory. The U.S. left implementing the agreement to the Hondurans, however, and said that it would accept the elections as a critical step for Honduras's future--even before the agreement had been fulfilled.
Most leaders in the hemisphere do not share this view. They share the position of Ricardo Lagos, former President of Chile and member of the agreement's Verification Commission that Micheletti broke the agreement and Zelaya must be restored. Now, Argentina and Brazil have denounced the elections as an attempt to legitimize the coup.
At the same time, conditions inside Honduras are troubling. The de facto government has routinely violated Honduran citizens' rights--repressing protesters, imposing curfews, censoring pro-Zelaya media, and suspending constitutional freedoms. In this tense climate, parties drastically cut back on campaign activity. Now, Zelaya and his supporters are promoting a boycott, threatening legal action, and pledging to mobilize supporters. And, with several recent unsolved explosions in the country, many voters remain afraid of election-day violence. Election officials themselves have declared that "the candidate to beat is abstentionism," as many voters may stay away from the polls in protest or out of fear. Furthermore, dozens of mayoral and congressional candidates have withdrawn from the elections in solidarity with Zelaya.
These international and domestic factors all suggest that the elections will not bring a quick resolution to this crisis. After Sunday, the Honduran people will likely continue to confront a deeply divided society and a crippled economy. Meanwhile, the Obama administration will likely remain at odds with Latin American countries with whom it had hoped to restore congenial relations after the Bush era.
But perhaps the greatest loser will be the hemispheric consensus to defend liberal democracy. In the last three decades, from Haiti to Peru, the region has effectively pushed back on coups and democratic transgressions. Allowing the Honduran coup to stand has eroded this hard-won consensus.
Looking forward, the diplomatic divisions emerging from the crisis will only weaken the international community's authority to hold accountable leaders like Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega and the judicial and legislative systems that they control. It will also enable these leaders to decry the hypocrisy of their critics, who argue that elections are the solution in Honduras while denying their legitimacy in Venezuela and Nicaragua. Furthermore, by not allowing Zelaya to return in a limited form, the events over the last four months have converted Zelaya into an unlikely and undeserved democratic hero, allowing his defenders to ignore the threat he posed to Honduran democracy.
Fingers are crossed throughout the Americas for a speedy conclusion to the Honduran crisis. But Sunday's elections may not present the exit we all hope for. Instead, no matter how transparent they may be, Sunday's elections may mark a defeat for the hemisphere's ability to stand firm against coups, rein in overzealous presidents, and hold fast to a conception of liberal democracy on which we should all be able to agree.
Chris Sabatini is the senior director of policy at the Council of the Americas/Americas Society and editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Daniel Altschuler is a Rhodes Scholar and doctoral candidate in Politics at the University of Oxford.
On June 28th, the Honduran Congress and Supreme Court voted to remove President Manuel Zelaya. This followed Zelaya's disregard of their rejection of a planned ballot to allow for a constituent assembly. Acting under Supreme Court order, in the early morning, soldiers rousted the President and placed him--still in his pajamas--on a plane to Costa Rica. Because the removal strayed from the Honduran constitution, the international community immediately condemned the act as a coup and called for Zelaya's restoration. But the de facto government, led by Roberto Micheletti, asserted that the removal was constitutional, while admitting that Zelaya's exile--not to mention lack of due process--was a "mistake."
The international community's position was virtually unanimous, demanding Zelaya's restoration before previously scheduled November elections. Subsequently, Micheletti dragged his feet, thwarting regional negotiators' efforts to resolve the impasse and ignoring economic and diplomatic sanctions by the U.S. and others.
Last month, under pressure to find some exit, U.S. negotiators traveled to Tegucigalpa, engineered an agreement, and declared victory. The U.S. left implementing the agreement to the Hondurans, however, and said that it would accept the elections as a critical step for Honduras's future--even before the agreement had been fulfilled.
Most leaders in the hemisphere do not share this view. They share the position of Ricardo Lagos, former President of Chile and member of the agreement's Verification Commission that Micheletti broke the agreement and Zelaya must be restored. Now, Argentina and Brazil have denounced the elections as an attempt to legitimize the coup.
At the same time, conditions inside Honduras are troubling. The de facto government has routinely violated Honduran citizens' rights--repressing protesters, imposing curfews, censoring pro-Zelaya media, and suspending constitutional freedoms. In this tense climate, parties drastically cut back on campaign activity. Now, Zelaya and his supporters are promoting a boycott, threatening legal action, and pledging to mobilize supporters. And, with several recent unsolved explosions in the country, many voters remain afraid of election-day violence. Election officials themselves have declared that "the candidate to beat is abstentionism," as many voters may stay away from the polls in protest or out of fear. Furthermore, dozens of mayoral and congressional candidates have withdrawn from the elections in solidarity with Zelaya.
These international and domestic factors all suggest that the elections will not bring a quick resolution to this crisis. After Sunday, the Honduran people will likely continue to confront a deeply divided society and a crippled economy. Meanwhile, the Obama administration will likely remain at odds with Latin American countries with whom it had hoped to restore congenial relations after the Bush era.
But perhaps the greatest loser will be the hemispheric consensus to defend liberal democracy. In the last three decades, from Haiti to Peru, the region has effectively pushed back on coups and democratic transgressions. Allowing the Honduran coup to stand has eroded this hard-won consensus.
Looking forward, the diplomatic divisions emerging from the crisis will only weaken the international community's authority to hold accountable leaders like Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega and the judicial and legislative systems that they control. It will also enable these leaders to decry the hypocrisy of their critics, who argue that elections are the solution in Honduras while denying their legitimacy in Venezuela and Nicaragua. Furthermore, by not allowing Zelaya to return in a limited form, the events over the last four months have converted Zelaya into an unlikely and undeserved democratic hero, allowing his defenders to ignore the threat he posed to Honduran democracy.
Fingers are crossed throughout the Americas for a speedy conclusion to the Honduran crisis. But Sunday's elections may not present the exit we all hope for. Instead, no matter how transparent they may be, Sunday's elections may mark a defeat for the hemisphere's ability to stand firm against coups, rein in overzealous presidents, and hold fast to a conception of liberal democracy on which we should all be able to agree.
Chris Sabatini is the senior director of policy at the Council of the Americas/Americas Society and editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Daniel Altschuler is a Rhodes Scholar and doctoral candidate in Politics at the University of Oxford.